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This paper studies the relationship between the size of the banking sector’s 
refinancing needs vis-à-vis the central bank and auction rates in its open market 
operations in times of financial market stress. In a theoretical model, it is found that 
marginal rates at central bank auctions may increase if the share of troubled banks 
becomes too high relative to the total size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs. 
An empirical analysis then aims at determining the size of open market operations 
needed to absorb large stress levels in interbank money markets and hence contain 
central bank auction rates. Finally, the paper analyses effects of the composition of 
open market operations of different maturities on auction rates. It is found that a too 
high share of longer-term refinancing induces a rise in auction rates which is 
undesirable. Therefore, the analysis suggests that there is a lower bound for the 
amount of liquidity provided through short-term operations. 
 
JEL codes: G01, G10, G21 
Key words: central bank, money market, open market operations, financial crisis 
 5
ECB




This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the desirable minimum size of a 
central bank’s liquidity deficit, that is, the amount of reserves the banking sector is in short 
supply every period vis-à-vis the central bank. The paper argues that if the central bank aims 
at well-behaved auction rates in its open market operations, it should ensure that the volume 
of these operations are above a certain threshold, which is dependent on the ability of the 
money market to distribute liquidity across banks.  
 
A situation is analysed in which a central bank conducts open market operations as variable 
rate tender auctions, and is concerned about possible deviations of the marginal tender rate at 
these auctions from its target rate. Such deviations may increase as result of imperfections in 
the interbank market, if the volume of open market operations is not adjusted upwards 
accordingly. In particular, the analysis demonstrates that for larger refinancing volumes, the 
presence of imperfections in the interbank market does not have an effect on the marginal rate 
at the central bank auction (it affects intra-marginal bid rates, but not the marginal rate itself). 
The same is true in case the proportion of banks facing difficulties in the interbank market is 
small. 
 
If, however, the size of the operation becomes too small, then the demand for central bank 
funds becomes dominated by banks with high liquidity needs who want to avoid having to 
pay a large rate in the interbank market. In this case, there is an upward effect on the marginal 
rate. The premium banks are willing to pay reflects banks’ problems they encounter in the 
interbank market. It is shown that it is not the amount of liquidity supplied per se which is of 
importance, but rather its relation to the dispersion of liquidity shocks. 
 
The paper concludes that the size of the refinancing volume of a particular central bank 
operation may have an impact on rates in this auction. In particular, for very small volumes, 
there can be upward pressure on interest rates. Of course, it does not follow from the analysis 
that the overall relationship between bid rates and refinancing volumes is necessarily 
negative, as only a particular feature of bidding behaviour is modelled that is most likely to be 
observed for smaller volumes. The analysis instead establishes a lower bound for the amount 
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The empirical results broadly support these findings. Using the experience of the period of 
fixed rate tender with full-allotment and ranking all participating banks by a proxy variable 
for their marginal valuation for central bank liquidity, possible measures of the minimum 
liquidity deficit were derived. To this end, the amount of Eurosystem refinancing demand 
displayed by the 25% of banking groups with the highest valuation of central bank liquidity 
was used. Contrasting this amount with the liquidity deficit from before the start of the 
financial crisis in August 2007 shows that the EUR 450 billion liquidity deficit may be almost 
sufficient to absorb the needs of the aforementioned top 25% banking groups. 
The paper also considers the issue whether the introduction of longer-term refinancing 
operations may help to smooth interest rates at open market operations over time. This was 
found not to be the case. Instead, when introducing operations with longer maturities, a 
central bank should take care that the volume in the shorter operations does not become too 
small relative to the diversity of banks, in order to avoid that an increase in interest rates is 
caused. Using the results from a recently conducted study on bidding behaviour in Main 
refinancing operations (MROs) of the Eurosystem during the financial crisis, it is shown that 
the increase of LTRO volumes at the expense of MRO volumes contributes to an average 
increase of 6.5 basis points in average MRO bid rates. Therefore, a central bank may, instead 
of shifting the maturity structure of its operations, opt to increase the total refinancing volume 
to banks. This would lower marginal interest rates, and leave room for the introduction of 




Since the start of the financial crisis in August 2007, the ability of central banks to 
steer money market rates has been put to the forefront of interest. As loss of 
confidence and uncertainty about counterparty credit risk increased, banks 
increasingly relied on central bank financing. During the early stage of the financial 
crisis, central banks have taken on a more and more active role as liquidity providers. 
For instance, the Eurosystem altered the time-path of liquidity supply to the banking 7
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sector, relaxed their collateral standards and introduced a time-shift in the maturity 
structure of their operations. With the help of these policies, short term money market 
rates were by and large contained to the desired ranges – although with increased 
volatility. During this period, the size of the liquidity providing operations was an 
important factor for steering conditions in the money market. If an operation was “too 
small”, relative to the prevailing stress level in the money market, the resulting price 
for central bank liquidity could be very high, thus driving up short term money market 
rates and adding further stress via this signal to the market.  
 
In this paper, we aim to provide both a theoretical foundation for the relation between 
the size of a central bank’s liquidity deficit
2 and auction rates in its open market 
operations in times of financial market stress, and an empirical analysis which aims at 
determining the size of open market operations needed to absorb large stress levels in 
interbank money markets and hence to contain central bank auction rates.  
 
In particular, the theoretical part of the paper aims at guiding the optimal institutional 
set up for situations of increased financial market distress such as the early phase of 
the financial crisis, from August 2007 to September 2008, when most central banks 
around the world tried to address tensions in money markets using more standard 
tools.  
 
In the second phase of the crisis, starting with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
central banks resorted to so-called non-standard measures. As a consequence, in many 
cases, banks were given the freedom to demand as much central bank liquidity as they 
needed. The liquidity provision of the Eurosystem during this period serves as the 
basis for our empirical analysis. Using the example of the Eurosystem’s tender 
operations from October 2008 to June 2009, we derive several measures of the 
minimum amount of liquidity needed to absorb demand from banks which are likely 
to display a very high marginal valuation for central bank liquidity, thus driving up 
marginal tender rates.  
 
                                                 
2 The liquidity deficit in the sense used in this paper is the amount of reserves the banking sector is in 
short supply every period vis-à-vis the central bank. It can therefore be seen as the structural overhang 
of permanent liquidity absorbing factors (like banknotes and reserve requirements) on the liability side 
over permanent liquidity providing items, like outright asset holdings of the central bank. Using this 
definition, it becomes clear that our concept of liquidity deficit equals the size of refinancing 
operations, as long as no additional absorbing factors like debt certificates are used on the liability side 
of the central banks’ balance sheet. 8
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The results of the analysis can shed light on the appropriate choice of the liquidity 
deficit during the phasing-out of the extraordinary measures that were implemented 
during the financial turmoil of 2007-2010. 
 
The second focus of the paper is the maturity structure of central bank refinancing 
operations. Let us again consider the example of the Eurosystem.
3 Since the last 
change to the operational framework of the Eurosystem in March 2004, the bulk of 
refinancing was provided to the market using operations with short maturity (one 
week), while only a smaller fraction (about one third) was provided with a maturity of 
three months. During the early phase of the crisis until August 2008, this relationship 
was roughly reversed, as the drying-up of liquidity in markets for term refinancing led 
the Eurosystem to enhance its three-months refinancing at the expense of one-week 
operations and hence lengthen the maturity structure of its operations.
4 When the 
crisis intensified, demand in longer term refinancing operations increased further, 
bringing the share of standard one-week liquidity at times below 10%.  
 
A sound theoretical basis for these choices (i.e. the policy choice of the central bank 
in the early phase and the endogenous choice of the banks in the later period of the 
crisis) has yet to be found. While this paper does not aim at developing a full-fledged 
analysis of the optimal maturity mix of open market operations, it does point out that 
a central bank that wants to avoid elevated marginal rates in its open market 
operations should take care that changes in the maturity structure of its operations do 
not augment tender spreads in existing operations. At the core of our analysis stands 
the observation that tender rates in the one-week operations sharply increased after the 
change of the maturity profile. This leads us to conjecture that there might be a lower 
size limit to open market operations under variable rate tender regimes (seen in 
relation to the banking sector’s aggregate reserve requirement). At the same time, we 
elaborate on the intermediary function of central banks, which since the start of the 
market turmoil has increased in importance.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers a theoretical analysis of banks’ 
demand for refinancing at a central bank auction, in an environment where banks face 
constraints of varying degrees when borrowing in the unsecured interbank market. 
The empirical analysis in section 3 derives several measures of the liquidity deficit 
needed to absorb high stress levels in euro area money markets, using participating 
                                                 
3 Also the Fed and the Bank of England did lengthen the maturity structure of their liquidity provision. 
4 This relationship held until September 2008 when in the wake of the further escalation of the banking 
crisis as a temporary measure fixed rate tender with full allotment in both MROs and LTROs were 
announced. 9
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banking groups’ demand in the operations with fixed-rate tenders and full-allotment 
conducted by the Eurosystem between October 2008 and June 2009. The following 
section 4 extends the theoretical analysis of section 2 to a framework with two periods 
that allows the analysis of operations with different maturities. The empirical part of 
this section uses the results of an econometric analysis of the relationship between 
bidding rates at the ECB’s tenders and the size of its operations, using the experience 
gained in variable rate tender operations between August 2007 and September 2008. 
The last section concludes. 
 
  
2  The baseline model 
 
We assume that the central bank wishes to supply a certain amount of refinancing to 
the banking sector, S, for one period. This amount is based on the aggregate liquidity 
needs of the banking sector.
5 There is a continuum of banks of measure one in the 
economy, and all these banks can participate in the central bank’s open market 
operations.  
 
We assume that banks experience two types of shocks: liquidity and solvency shocks. 
Liquidity shocks imply that banks need to raise different amounts of liquidity (central 
bank money), either in the market or from the central bank. In particular, banks’ 
demand for central bank funds π can vary between πH (in this case, the bank is cash-
short) and πL (i.e. the bank is cash-long), where πL < πH, and πL < 0 is possible. That 
is, cash-long banks can have a positive or negative overall liquidity demand. 
 
The solvency shock affects a bank’s probability of being solvent in the next period, 
and thus directly affects the probability that it can repay a loan (either to the central 
bank or to another lending bank). It is modelled in the following way: We assume that 
banks receive correct signals about each other’s solvency prior to the central bank 
auction. These signals indicate a bank’s probability of being solvent, and, more 
specifically, its probability to repay a loan obtained in the (unsecured) interbank 
market. For simplicity, we assume that signals reveal the true type of the banks. It is 
assumed that the probability of being solvent v is uniformly distributed on the interval 
(0,1]. Thus, f(v)=1 for v∈(0,1]. Different types of banks are charged different rates in 
the interbank market: banks that are surely solvent pay the risk-free rate 1+r, while 
troubled banks need to pay a premium p(v) which compensates lenders for the 
                                                 
5 One determining factor for aggregate liquidity needs are reserve requirements. Also, so-called 
autonomous factors are considered, i.e. factors which are not under direct control of the central bank, 
such as the demand for banknotes. 10
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additional risk they take when lending to more risky institutions. We assume that the 
interbank market is a lender’s market and that interest rates are such that lenders are 
indifferent between lending to borrowers with different probabilities of repayment. 
This requires  )) ( 1 ( 1
!










As is intuitive, p(v) is decreasing in v – that is, the higher the probability of solvency 
of a bank, the lower the premium it needs to pay in the interbank market. 
 
We furthermore assume that the liquidity shock by a certain bank is correlated with its 
solvency: in particular, the lower the probability of being solvent, the higher is the 
liquidity shortage of a bank. This assumption, while important for the results of the 
model, seems in general to reflect reality quite well and has been, in particular, a 
salient feature of the current financial crisis. We assume a simple relationship 
between v and a bank’s liquidity demand 
 
) ( ) ( L H H v v d π π π − − =      (1) 
 
This implies that banks which are surely solvent (v=1) have a low liquidity demand 
πL, while those that are almost certainly bankrupt (v→0), face high demand for 
liquidity,  πH. The assumption of a uniform distribution of solvency shocks thus 
implies that the liquidity shock is distributed uniformly as well, between πL and πH.  
 
Banks can obtain liquidity at the central bank’s open market operation, or by trading 
liquidity in an interbank market. We assume that banks obtain funds in these ways 
only to satisfy their own liquidity needs – that is, they do not borrow more than 
needed from the central bank in order to lend some of the funds to other banks in the 
interbank market. Moreover, we assume that there is no stigma associated with 
borrowing from the central bank or in the market. 
 
 
Consider the following timing: 
 
•  the central bank decides upon the refinancing volume S 
•  banks receive liquidity shocks π ∈ [πL , πH]  
•  peer banks receive a perfect signal about each individual banks’ solvency 
probability v, which is correlated with π 11
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•  the central bank auction takes place (where banks bid b(v), depending on their 
type v, and the marginal interest rate is denoted 1+b*) 
•  the interbank market takes place (at the risk-free interest rate 1+r plus the 
appropriate premium p(v)). 
 
2.1  Central bank liquidity supply 
 
We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty and that the central bank is perfectly 
able to forecast aggregate liquidity needs. The central bank chooses its liquidity 
supply to match the aggregate (average) demand, i.e.  D S
!
=  where  
π π π ≡ + = =∫ ) (
2
1
) ( ) (
1
0
L H dv v f v d D  
corresponds to the midpoint between πL and πH (i.e. the average individual liquidity 
demand). It is assumed that the system operates in a liquidity deficit vis-à-vis the 
central bank so that  0 > π . 
 
Furthermore, we assume that no liquidity shocks occur after the central bank auction. 
In this case, since the central bank will always supply just the amount of liquidity that 
is needed to satisfy aggregate liquidity demand, demand and supply are balanced, and 
the risk-free interest rate 1+r in the interbank market (i.e. that rate charged to banks 
that are considered to have a zero probability of default) is at the same, predictable 
level.
6 
The central bank conducts its open market operation as a variable rate tender, in 
which banks bid one pair of a quantity and the interest rate they are willing to pay. 
The highest bids are served first, until the allotted quantity equals the total supply S. 




2.3  Liquidity demand at the central bank auction 
 
When entering the central bank auction, banks’ opportunity cost of funding is given 
by their ability to obtain funds in the interbank market, which in turn is a function of 
                                                 
6 If we abstract from the need to post collateral in central bank operations, the risk-free rate 
corresponds to the minimum bid rate of the auction. 
7 In real-life auctions, with step-wise bid schedules, banks might be rationed on a pro-rate basis at the 
marginal rate. In the present model, the demand curve is continuous, so no rationing is needed. 12
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their probability of solvency, v. The rate they need to pay in the interbank market, 1+r 
+ p(v), determines their bid rate at the central bank auction,
8 
 
b(v)=1+ r + p(v). 
 
In order to determine the marginal bid rate at that auction, the aggregate demand 
curve needs to be established. Aggregate demand is given by  
) (
2





v dv v f v d v D π π π − − = =∫  




) 1 ( 1
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= ≡ .    (2) 
 
The marginal bid rate is determined by the bid rate that equalizes demand and supply, 
i.e. by the b that satisfies 
π = =S b D
!
*) (.  
















      ( 3 )  
 
 
Figure 1 below illustrates two examples of the demand curve (or better: its inverse, 
the bid curve, given that bid rates b figure on the vertical axis, and demand D on the 
horizontal one).
9 In the first panel, an example with πL > 0 is chosen. In this case, the 
bid curve is downward sloping until it reaches the risk-free rate 1+ r at bid rate b1. 
This is the marginal rate of the auction, since at this rate, all bids above the marginal 
rate are successful. All bids below this rate are unsuccessful. Therefore, the other bid 
rate for which demand equals supply, b2, is irrelevant in this case. 
 
The second panel depicts an example with πL < 0. Since  0 > π , this corresponds to 
the case of a very unequal distribution of liquidity needs – relative to the size of the 
deficit,π . Again, the bid curve is downward sloping. In contrast to the other example, 
                                                 
8 This might be simplifying, as distortionary factors such as bid shading are not considered. 
9 Note that the somewhat unusual shape of the bid curve, which is backwards bending, is a result of 
allowing for negative individual liquidity demand. In reality, banks with excess liquidity bid an amount 
of zero. The results of this section would not change if we allowed for zero bidding. 13
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here, the interest rate at which demand first equals supply is b2, so that b2 is the 
marginal rate for the auction. Thus, in this case, the marginal rate is higher than the 
risk free rate.  
From (2), it is easy to see that  
  
0 2 1 > ⇔ < L b b π . 
 
















marginal rate  
b1=1+r


















marginal rate  
b2 >1+r
Figure 1: The bid curve for positive and negative πL.: in the left-hand panel (πL>0), the 
marginal rate is b1, the risk-free rate. In the right-hand panel (πL<0), the marginal rate 
equals b2, higher than the risk-free rate. 
 
In other words, if both cash-short and cash-long banks have a positive liquidity 
demand, then the marginal rate will be low (and equal to b1). In this case, demand will 
be composed of both types of banks, including also surely solvent banks (for which v 
is close to or equal to 1), who are the marginal bidders in the auction, and whose bid 
1+r determines the marginal rate. 
 
If, however, the demand of cash-long banks is negative (e.g. these banks have excess 
liquidity), then the marginal rate increases to b2. This is because in this case, demand 
at the auction will be dominated by cash-short banks, which are more likely to have 
solvency problems. These banks bid above the risk-free rate, and cause the higher 
marginal rate. 
 
The single condition for this to happen is to have banks with a liquidity surplus 
0 < L π . Note, however, that the central bank can steer the size of the liquidity deficit 
π (e.g. by changing reserve requirements) and thereby influence the sign of  L π . With 14
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this relationship in mind, and comparing the values b1 and b2 in equation (3), it 
becomes evident that  
 
a)  for any given distribution of liquidity needs across banks, marginal tender 
rates are higher, the smaller the liquidity deficit; and  
 
b)  for any given size of the liquidity deficit, tender rates are higher the higher the 
dispersion of liquidity needs across banks.  
 
In particular, the relation between the two is crucial: a larger divergence between 
liquidity needs does not lead to an elevated marginal rate if it is accommodated by a 
larger liquidity deficit. Thus, if a central bank wants to avoid that bid rates increase, it
should take care that the liquidity deficit (or the size of the auction) is not too small in 
relation to the divergence of liquidity needs of banks. 
 
The above results were derived for the specific case of a uniform distribution of 
solvency types, and for a linear relationship between solvency and liquidity needs.
These assumptions are of course simplifying, however, not essential to generate the
results. Still, some relationship between solvency and liquidity is necessary for the 
above to hold. If solvency and liquidity were uncorrelated, the marginal rate would 
always equal the risk-free rate. 
 
One further step in the analysis would be to introduce specifically a variable that 
would capture the state of the economy – for instance, the ability of banks to raise
funds in the interbank market. In the above model, banks are always able to obtain 
funds in the interbank market, provided they are willing to pay the appropriate interest 
rate. During the ongoing financial crisis, however, some banks (at times: most banks) 
were unable to raise any funds in the interbank market and were completely 
dependent on central bank refinancing.
10 In this sense, the model captures a rather
conservative case compared to the crisis period. 
 
The analysis shows that not only the congruence of aggregate liquidity supply and 
demand matters for the determination of interest rates at central bank auctions. 
Instead, the ability of the interbank market to effectively distribute liquidity across the 
                                                 
10 Two theories explain the breakdown of the interbank market. First, banks may have been unwilling 
to lend out funds because they were uncertain about own future liquidity needs (see, e.g. Eisenschmidt 
and Tapking, 2009). Second, adverse selection in the interbank market, caused by asymmetric 
information about counterparties’ solvency may have induced banks to hoard liquidity (see Heider et 
al, 2009). 15
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banking sector is also important. If this function is impaired, for instance because of 
asymmetric information, liquidity hoarding or (as in this model) heightened 
counterparty credit risk, then marginal bid rates at open market operations can 
increase significantly.  
 
The model illustrates that a surge in counterparty credit risk in the interbank market 
does not necessarily imply that the marginal rate in the central bank auction is 
affected. This is only the case if the distribution of banks’ liquidity needs is wide 
relative to the total refinancing volume offered by the central bank. If the liquidity 
deficit, however, is large enough, refinancing operations will be large enough leading 
to a situation in which the marginal rate of the operation will be determined by those 
banks that are able to borrow at the risk free interest rate.  
 
This analysis suggests that central banks that are eager to tightly control the marginal 
rate of their operations should take into account the state of the interbank market and 
the level of credit risk of banks for the design of their balance sheet and thus their 
refinancing volume. The more impaired the market, the higher should be this volume. 
Otherwise, the central bank risks the emergence of a large spread between marginal 
rates and its target rate. 
 
It should be stressed at this point, that these considerations do not take into account 
potentially adverse effects stemming from large refinancing volumes. First, a too 
large intermediation role of the central bank may crowd-out money market activity. 
Secondly, larger refinancing operations are, ceteris paribus, associated with a more 
significant liquidity insurance function of the central bank, which may increase moral 
hazard. Lastly, absorbing financial market stress levels through large auctions works 
through the central bank taking credit risk on its balance sheet, which may socially 
not be desirable. Ideally, this credit risk should be appropriately priced.  
 
3  Empirical Analysis 
We now turn to the data. To this end, a panel containing bidding data for 1730 
banking groups active in Eurosystem refinancing operations or using Eurosystem 
standing facilities for the period from January 2007 until August 2010 was used.  
 
3.1  The liquidity deficit, central bank refinancing and tender design 
 
The liquidity deficit is the quantity of central bank reserves the banking system is in 
short supply each reserve maintenance period, due to refinancing needs arising from 16
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reserve requirements and autonomous factors
11. In other words, the size of the 
liquidity deficit provides a lower bound for the aggregate demand for central bank 
reserves and hence the size of the refinancing operations. For illustrative purposes, the 
evolution of both, the size of the liquidity deficit and the overall size of the 
refinancing operations for the euro area from January 2007 until June 2009 are 
depicted in figure 2 below.  






















01jan2007 01jul2007 01jan2008 01jul2008 01jan2009 01jul2009
Time
Liquidity Deficit Liquidity Provision
 
Figure 2: Aggregate Eurosystem liquidity provision and liquidity needs of the banking sector, January 
2007 to May 2009 
 
It can be seen from Figure 2 that during normal times, e.g. in terms of the above chart 
from January 2007 until August 2007, both variables are closely aligned. With the 
start of the financial crisis and the increasing tensions in euro area money markets, the 
ECB changed the supply pattern of liquidity throughout the maintenance period, i.e. 
more liquidity than needed was provided at the beginning of the reserve maintenance 
period reducing the excess allotments gradually during the course of the period. This 
pattern is clearly visible from the chart above and ends with the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers and the subsequent introduction of fixed-rate tenders with full 
allotment in all refinancing operations of the Eurosystem. From 14 October 2008 
onwards, banks themselves determined the amount of central bank liquidity in euro 
area money markets. This endogeneity of euro area liquidity provision resulted in an 
extended period with substantial amounts of aggregate excess liquidity, which, of 
                                                 
11 The most important autonomous factors in the Eurosystem are banknotes in circulation and 
government deposits. Generally, autonomous factors are refinancing needs which are not influenced by 
the central bank. 17
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course, was reflected in persistent and large recourses to the deposit facility of the 
Eurosystem.   
 
The liquidity deficit, between January 2007 and August 2008 hovering around EUR 
450 billion (displaying only a slight upward trend), increased substantially in October 
2008 and reached a value of more than EUR 600 billion. This mainly reflected an 
increase of banknotes in circulation and government deposits, with both developments 
being related to the intensification of the financial crisis after the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers. 
 
Recent research on the determinants of short term money markets (see Linzert and 
Schmidt 2008 or Cassola and Morana 2008 for empirical approaches and Valimäki 
2008 for a theoretical model) finds that, during normal times, a large liquidity deficit 
may have unwanted side effects: with higher volumes in the auctions, operational 
risks in these auctions increase and as a consequence tender spreads
12 (and via this 
channel short-term money market rates) may be biased upwards (see Eisenschmidt, 
Hirsch and Linzert (2009) for a discussion on the influence of the size of MROs and 
LTROs on the tender spread and Würtz (2006) on the determinants of the tender 
spread in general). In the light of these results, a small liquidity deficit seems 
desirable from the perspective of optimal monetary policy implementation. 
 
During times of financial crisis, however, this relationship seems to be reversed or at 
least is likely to be superseded by considerations relating to effective implementation 
as well as financial stability. Given increased levels of counterparty risk and elevated 
uncertainty about liquidity shocks, money market intermediation of liquidity shocks, 
relying on thousands of unsecured interbank transactions every day, is plagued by an 
increasing level of frictions and may break down altogether. In such circumstances, 
the size of the liquidity deficit becomes a crucial input into the effectiveness of 
monetary policy implementation and the financial stability dimension of the monetary 
policy implementation framework.  
 
The theoretical model of section 2, in which, depending on the share and liquidity 
demand of troubled or “ostracised” banks in the banking system, standard tender 
volumes can become too small and, as a consequence, strongly increasing marginal 
bid rates are observed, is capturing the essence of this argument. This finding mirrors 
closely the experience made in the first period of the financial crisis until the 
                                                 
12 The tender spread is usually defined to be the difference between the marginal (or stop-out) rate of 
the tender and the minimum bid rate (or policy rate) prevailing at the tender. 18
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bankruptcy of Lehman Brother, where a variable rate tender procedure with a pre-set 
amount was used in liquidity providing operations of the ECB.  
 
An indication of the minimum size of the liquidity deficit needed to absorb 
heightened stress levels in euro area money markets is therefore a crucial lesson from 
the financial crisis. This should also be of use for the further development of the 
framework for monetary policy implementation, enhancing its effectiveness and 
strengthening its financial stability dimension. 
 
3.2  Estimating the minimum liquidity deficit from fixed-rate tenders with 
full-allotment   
 
The current episode of fixed-rate tenders with full allotment – in which banks 
themselves determine the amount of liquidity they need – provides an invaluable 
empirical basis to determine the minimum size of the liquidity deficit during times of 
intense money market stress. 
 
A first (and relatively simple) approach to determine the minimum size of the 
liquidity deficit is to calculate the amount demanded by banks that have shown above 
average reliance on Eurosystem refinancing during the period of fixed-rate tender 
with full allotment procedure, relative to their average demand behavior. In order to 
obtain a measure of banking groups that are above average user in this sense we first 
standardize individual banks’ bid volumes.
13 Let i
t x  denote the value of the bid 




t x x σ µ / ) ( ~ − ≡ , where 
i µ  and  i σ  denote, respectively, the sample mean and 
sample standard deviation for banking group i. Our dataset contains 1588 active 
banking groups (out of a total of 1730) and their bid schedules in 187 main 
refinancing operations (MROs)
14, this transformation gives rise to 296956 different 
values 
i
t x ~ . Over time and within groups, each variable has a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of 1.  
 
We then proceed to compute a time average for the normalised values 
i
t x ~  for each 
banking group for the period starting with the first fixed-rate tender with full 
                                                 
13 We are indebted to Simone Manganelli for fruitful discussions on the procedure. 
14 Main refinancing operations used to be (prior to the financial turmoil) the main source of refinancing 
to the banking sector. These are weekly operations with a one-week maturity. Longer-term operations 
used to have a maturity of 3 months, but were during the turmoil supplemented with 1, 6 and 12 month 
operations. 19
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allotment on 14 October 2008 until the week before the first one-year tender operation 
was conducted, i.e. until 16 June 2009.  
 
The restricted sample was chosen for two reasons. First, in order to control for the 
specific nature of the one-year supplementary longer-term operation (SLTRO) 
conducted on 24 June 2009, which may have attracted opportunistic bids from 
banking groups otherwise absent from Eurosystem operations due to the very 
attractive conditions of this operation and the subsequent one-year SLTROs. Second, 
in order to only consider the effect of one specific shock (the Lehman bankruptcy), 
which clearly dominates this time period.  
 
We then rank the resulting time averages, i.e. the banking group with the highest 
average deviation from its overall demand behaviour is ranked first and so on. Finally, 
we obtain the outstanding quantity of Eurosystem refinancing at each point of the 
sample for the so-ranked population of banking groups.  
 
As an example, the resulting summary statistics for the first quartile of these groups of 
banks is contained in Table 1 below. The refinancing volume demanded by the 25% 
of banking groups displaying the most changed demand behaviour, varies 




Sample period  Outstanding Eurosystem refinancing volume in EUR billion 
and share of total outstanding Eurosystem refinancing, 1st 
quartile of banking groups, ranked after their change in 
bidding behaviour in terms of volumes 
Min Max  Mean   
Volume Share  Volume Share  Volume  Share 
14 October 2008 –   
16 June 2009 
359 50%  503  63%  428  59% 
Table 1: Minimum liquidity deficit, as defined by demand from banks that are reliant above average on 
Eurosystem refinancing 
 
Figure 3 below illustrates graphically the path outstanding refinancing for all quartiles 
of the minimum liquidity deficit over time, from 14 October 2008 onwards.  20
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15oct2008 15dec2008 14feb2009 16apr2009 16jun2009
1st quartile 1st and 2nd quartile
1st, 2nd and 3rd quartile All banking groups
  
Figure 3: Outstanding Eurosystem refinancing for all active banking groups ranked after changes in 
demand behavior, in EUR billion 
 
Taking a prudent approach (i.e. using the maximum value from table 1), it emerges 
that the size of liquidity deficit before the start of the financial crisis (EUR 450 
billion) was close to sufficient to satisfy bids from the top 25% of banking groups 
EUR 503 billion), using the degree of their change in demand after the introduction of 
the fixed-rate tender with full allotment relative to their overall bidding behaviour as a 
ranking criterion.  
 
Although this simple ranking procedure may include some bidding by banking groups 
taking advantage of the easy access to central bank liquidity and very risk averse 
acting banking groups, it is likely to include the bulk of the distressed bidders. 
Accordingly, using this metric and having in mind the theoretical model of section 2, 
a liquidity deficit smaller than EUR 450-500 billion may not be sufficient to fully 
absorb the demand for central bank refinancing of banks in times of severe money 
market stress and therefore lead to very high marginal tender rates during episodes of 
money market tensions.  
 
Note that, although we are using data from a period with fixed rate tender with full 
allotment, our results are applicable to a regime with variable rate tender procedure. 
First of all, we are interested in a size measure of banks displaying a high demand for 
central bank refinancing. The fixed-rate full allotment tender episode provides the 21
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best possible data, since banking groups have no incentive to bid strategically. 
Second, we are interested in a prudent measure, i.e. we want to obtain the size of the 
liquidity deficit that is large enough to absorb the highest stress levels observed in 
financial markets. There is little doubt that the period between October 2008 and June 
2009 was associated with unprecedented levels of financial market stress.  
 
Therefore, in following this approach, we are able to obtain an estimate of a lower 
size limit of central bank refinancing operations under heightened financial market 
stress. Note, however, that using this size measure to calibrate central bank auctions 
does not imply that in reality tender rates during periods of financial market stress are 
always closely aligned to policy rates. There are other factors influencing tender 
spreads, like allotment uncertainty, asymmetric information and strategic bidding, all 
of which are likely to be elevated under conditions of overall financial market stress. 
Nevertheless, the size measure we obtain should be seen as a useful guide to avoid 
extreme tender rates solely due to heightened counterparty credit risk. 
 
 
4  Refinancing operations of different maturities 
 
4.1   Some theoretical considerations 
 
During the financial crisis many central banks reacted by providing liquidity to banks 
at longer maturities than usual. For instance, the Eurosystem, which had prior to the 
turmoil provided the bulk of liquidity in one-week operations, introduced several 
supplementary longer-term operations with maturities of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. This 
was done in an environment of increased demand for longer-term operations, be it for 
regulatory purposes or as insurance for banks to secure funds for a longer time 
horizon. The high demand for longer-term operations (compared to one-week 
operations) became even more evident when a full allotment policy was applied to 
those operations as of October 2008. 
 
This section does not aim at explaining the reasons behind the increased demand for 
longer-term refinancing, or dispute the necessity of adjusting the liquidity supply to 
this demand. Instead, it points at some constraints when doing this adjustment (or 
when reversing it), along the lines set out in section 2. 
 22
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Consider a setup similar to the model described in section 2, but with a two period 
horizon. The central bank conducts a one-period liquidity auction in each period. We 
assume that banks’ liquidity needs in both periods are completely independent - this 
assumption would reflect, inter alia, that both periods represent different reserve 
maintenance windows. In this case, banks’ bidding behaviour would, in each period, 
be equivalent to the one described in section 2: whenever the distribution of liquidity 
demand is very dispersed relative to the size of the total refinancing at the central 
bank’s auctions so that some banks have a negative liquidity demand, the marginal 
rate of the auction increases. 
 
Depending on the state of the financial sector at the time of each auction, the marginal 
rate at each point in time will differ. Let us consider the case where tensions in 
financial markets lead to an elevated marginal rate at both auctions, i.e. the marginal 
rates b1 and b2 in the two periods are given by 
 
} 2 , 1 { ) 1 ( = +
+
−













Taking the policy rate (or risk free rate) as constant, time-varying conditions in the 
banking sector (e.g. in this model, πH and πL) will lead to differing marginal rates 
across time. As an example, let us consider the case that conditions at time 2 are 
already known at time 1, and that they are such that b2 > b1. 
 
Suppose that the central bank was interested in smoothing the evolution of the 
marginal rate over time by using two different policy tools 
 
1.  The introduction of a longer term operation that spans both periods 
2.  The adjustment of the total liquidity supply from period to period 
 
Let us consider the first option. A longer-term operation might be able to provide 
some stability in interest rates, as it could smooth demand in the one-period 
operations. To see whether this is the case, assume that total refinancing volume 
(liquidity supply) S stays constant over the two periods, and that a longer term (two-
period) operation is launched with volumes SL, which partially replaces supply in the 
one-period operations. Thus, S1 = S2 =S - SL.  
 
What is the marginal rate in this longer-term operation? When banks place their bids 
at time 1, they know that they can either bid in the one-period operations and pay a 23
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low interest rate at time 1, but a higher one at time 2. The interest rate they are willing 
to pay for the two-period operation will just be the weighted average of the two short-
term interest rates, and the resulting marginal rate bL will satisfy b1 < bL < b2. 
 
What is the effect on marginal rates in the one-period operations? Because the longer-
term operation will reduce both demand and supply in these operations to the same 
extent, the effect will be a mere scaling down of the operation. From section 2, we 
know, however, that a reduced size of the operation can have an augmenting effect on 
the interest rate. To see this, consider the case that the demand for all banks types (i.e. 
for all v) is reduced by d.
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Thus, the introduction of a longer-term operation leads to an increase in the marginal 
rate in both periods. This outcome is based on the initial assumption that we start in a 
situation with an already low volume of the operation, for which πL<0. If we 
considered the case of an appropriate volume in which all banks have a positive 
demand for liquidity, there would be no effect (or one that is less pronounced on the 
marginal rate). Thus, when a central bank introduces longer-term operations to 
accommodate the banking sector’s demand for it, it should take care that the volume 
in the operations of shorter maturity is not too low. In particular, this implies that it 
may be beneficial not to conduct operations of too many maturities at the same time. 
 
If the central bank was interested in smoothing marginal rates over time, it can instead 
resort to a different measure: the increase of the total refinancing volume. If the 
volume increases in times when liquidity conditions in the market are tenser (and 
liquidity needs are distributed more equally across participants), then the central bank 
can achieve a better smoothing of interest rates. If paired with an increase in the total 
volume, the introduction of longer-term operations should have a more limited effect 
on marginal rates in short-term operations. 
 
 
4.2   Increasing LTROs, reducing MROs: Implications for MRO rates 
 
In what follows one of the key findings of a recently conducted study on bidding 
behaviour in the ECB main refinancing operations during the financial crisis (see 
                                                 
15 A proportionate decline is not possible in the case of πL<0. 24
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Eisenschmidt, Hirsch and Linzert, EHL 2009) is discussed. The authors of the paper 
find, in line with many other studies conducted on the subject, that the (increasing) 
size of the MRO auction (i.e. the benchmark amount) has a positive effect on 
marginal tender rates in the pre-crisis period. In previous studies, this effect has 
mainly been attributed to allotment uncertainty which appears to be increasing in the 
size of the operation and hence leads to higher bid rates (see, e.g., Valimäki 2008 or 
Würtz 2006). 
 
At the same time, a new finding of EHL 2009 is that the higher the share of LTROs in 
total central bank refinancing, the higher will average bid rates (and hence MRO 
tender spreads) in MROs be.
16 This is an important finding which is relevant for the 
analysis presented in this paper, because a bigger size of LTROs implies a smaller 
volume of MROs. Therefore, the results of EHL 2009 can be directly used to “test” 
the empirical implications of the theory presented in section 4.1.  
 
A banks' bidding behavior can be measured by its participation decision, its individual 
bid amount, the weighted average bid rate and the bid rate dispersion. Since a bank's 
bid amount or its average bid rate can only be observed if the bank actually 
participated in the MRO, the estimation may be subject to a selection bias, see 
Heckman (1979). Accounting for banks' participation decision, EHL 2009 employ 
panel sample selection estimation technique, which extent the cross sectional 
Heckman approach to the panel case.  
 
The main focus of EHL 2009 is to identify the determinants of banks’ bid rates in 
order to explain the sources behind higher tender rates during the financial crisis. One 
may recall that the spread of the marginal bid rate of all banks over the minimum bid 
rate increased from 5 bps before the financial crisis to 16 bps, on average, in the 
period from August 2007 until October 2008.  
 
EHL 2009 estimate a panel regression using random effects explaining an individual 
bank’s bid rate (as the spread over the minimum bid rate) using a set of bank and 
auction specific characteristics as well as variables characterizing money market 
conditions. The estimations are conducted on a sample from April 2004 to October 
2008, while the crisis refers to the period from August 2007 to October 2008. The 
sample ends with the introduction of fixed-rate tender with full allotment in all ECB 
refinancing operations on 14 October 2008.  
                                                 
16 Similarly, Donati (2010) finds that the size of MROs have been positively contributed to money 
market spreads during the financial turmoil. 25
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Statistically, the crisis period is accounted for by including a respective dummy 
variable from August 2007 onwards, and allowing this dummy to interact with all the 
explanatory variables in the model. 
 
Table I in the appendix contains the regression results of EHL 2009. The first column 
contains the parameter estimates for the pre-turmoil period, spanning April 2004 until 
7 August 2007. The second column reports the joint parameter estimates for the crisis 
(14 August 2007 until 7 October 2008) and the pre-crisis period. This joint effect has 
two components, the parameter estimate for the pre-crisis period, if significant, added 
to the parameter estimate for the crisis period (also only if significant).  
 
If in the crisis period the statistical relationship between the dependent variable and 
explanatory variable did not change, the reported coefficients would be the same for 
both periods. On the other hand, if the explanatory variable was not significant in the 
pre-crisis period, an entry is still shown in the table but the joint effect will only 
consist in the (statistically significant) parameter estimate for the crisis period. The 
relevant parameter estimate, the expected size of the LTRO operation outstanding 
over the week following the MRO, is reported in Table 2 below.  
 
 
Variable Pre-crisis  Crisis 
Expected LTRO amount 
(log),  1 β  
0.0282   0.1508** 
Table 2: LTRO-size related parameter estimate of the EHL 2009 model, the 95% significance level is 
depicted by ** 
 
The average volume of outstanding LTROs increased by about 120 billion to 270 
billion euro from August 2007 to October 2008. Using the estimate of EHL2009, the 
shift from MROs to LTROs explains around 6.5 basis points of the total increase of 
around 16bps in average tender rates during the crisis period.
17 The panel regression 
of EHL2009 controls for a variety of other factors that also were shown to have 
driven up average bid rates. Among those, however, the LTRO variable is the second 
most important in quantitative terms.
18 Further, a variety of robustness checks was 
                                                 
17 To arrive at this number, divide the coefficient by 270 and multiply by 120, the result is in basis 
points, which is the specification of the dependent variable of EHL2009.  
18 Another important variable which EHL2009 show to have driven up average bid rates in MROs is 
the relative attractiveness of the collateral framework. Further, in another analysis on the same subject 
conducted by Cassola, N, Lazarov, V. and O’Brien, E. (2008), increased credit risk is found to have 
driven up tender rates.  26
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conducted, with the LTRO variable preserving sign and significance. From the 
empirical side, therefore, there are strong indications that the maturity shift of the 
ECB’s refinancing operations may have come at the cost of higher tender rates in the 
standard main refinancing operations. This is in line with the simple extension of our 




This paper argues that there is a minimum size limit for a central bank’s open market 
operations needed to guarantee well-behaved auction rates, which is dependent on 
conditions in the money market and aggregate credit risk. It develops arguments in 
favour of making the refinancing volume of a central bank dependent on the ability of 
the money market to distribute liquidity across banks. A situation is analysed in which 
a central bank conducts open market operations as variable rate tender auctions, and is 
concerned about possible deviations of the marginal tender rate at these auctions from 
its target rate. Such deviations may increase as result of imperfections in the interbank 
market, if the volume of open market operations is not adjusted upwards accordingly.  
 
In particular, the analysis demonstrates that for larger refinancing volumes, the 
presence of imperfections in the interbank market does not have an effect on the 
marginal rate at the central bank auction (it affects intra-marginal bid rates, but not the 
marginal rate itself). The same is true in case the proportion of banks facing 
difficulties in the interbank market is small. 
 
If, however, the size of the operation becomes too small, then demand for central 
bank funds becomes dominated by banks with high liquidity needs who want to avoid 
having to pay a large rate in the interbank market. In this case, there is an upward 
effect on the marginal rate. The premium banks are willing to pay reflects banks’ 
problems they encounter in the interbank market. It is shown that it is not the amount 
of liquidity supplied per se which is of importance, but rather its relation to the 
dispersion of liquidity shocks. 
 
We conclude that the size of the refinancing volume of a particular central bank 
operation may have an impact on rates in this auction. In particular, we have 
demonstrated that for very small volumes, there can be upward pressure on interest 
rates. Of course, it does not follow from the analysis that the overall relationship 
between bid rates and refinancing volumes is necessarily negative, as we have only 27
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modelled a particular feature of bidding behaviour that is most likely to be observed 
for smaller volumes. Also, we have abstracted from other determinants of bidding 
rates, such as collateral issues or possible market manipulation. The present analysis 
instead establishes a lower bound for the amount of refinancing a central bank may 
wish to provide to the banking sector for each maturity bracket.  
 
The empirical results broadly support these findings. Using the experience of the 
period of fixed-rate tender with full allotment and ranking all participating banks by 
the degree of change of their demand behaviour relative to their own average, possible 
measures of the minimum liquidity deficit were derived. To this end, the amount of 
Eurosystem refinancing demand displayed by the top 25% “demand changing” 
banking groups was used. Contrasting this amount with the liquidity deficit from 
before the start of the financial crisis in August 2007 shows that the EUR 450 billion 
liquidity deficit may be almost sufficient to absorb the needs of the aforementioned 
top 25% banking groups.  
 
The paper also considered the issue whether the introduction of longer-term 
refinancing operations may help to smooth interest rates at open market operations 
over time. This was found not to be the case. Instead, when introducing operations 
with longer maturities, a central bank should take care that the volume in the shorter 
operations does not become too small relative to the diversity of banks, in order to 
avoid that an increase in interest rates is caused. Using the results from a recently 
conducted study on bidding behaviour in MROs of the Eurosystem during the 
financial crisis, it is shown that the increase of LTRO volumes at the expense of MRO 
volumes contributes to an average increase of 6.5 basis points in average MRO bid 
rates. Therefore, a central bank may, instead of shifting the maturity structure of its 
operations, opt to increase the total refinancing volume to banks. This would lower 
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Annex: Table I 
 
Variables Pre-turmoil  Turmoil 
Bank specific, time constant characteristics     
Eonia-panel bank  -0.0041*  0.0075** 
Fine-tuning counterparty  -0.0052**  -0.0119** 
Medium sized bank  -0.0034**  -0.0162** 
Large bank  -0.0044**  -0.0259** 
    
Auction specific financial market conditions     
Collateral premium  0.0014  0.0433** 
Eoniavolume 0.0030**  -0.0787** 
Swap spread  0.6073**  -0.115** 
Volatility of 1 week Eonia swap  0.0006  0.0031** 
    
Auction specific characteristics     
Last MRO of maintenance period  0.0077**  -0.0122** 
Benchmark amount   0.0325**  -0.0473** 
Expected outstanding overall LTRO volume  0.0282  0.1508** 
Garch percentage alloment rate  0.0027  0.0324** 
    
Auction and bank specific characteristics     
Maturing allotment  0.0028**  0.00061** 
Allotment amount in preceding LTRO   -0.0004  -0.0016** 
Optout behaviour  -0.0030*  -0.0413** 
    
End of year  0.1092**  0.1092** 
End of quarter  -0.0078**  0.1161** 
 
Notes: Results were obtained from a random effects panel regression which includes the 
inverse Mills ratio (obtained from a panel Probit regression) to correct for selection bias. The 
turmoil period is accounted for by including a respective dummy variable from August 2007 
onwards, but also allowing this dummy variable to interact with all the explanatory variables 
in the model. The second column is the sum of the two coefficients (pre-turmoil and turmoil) 
in the case the interaction coefficient turned out significant. * denotes significance on the 10% 
level, while ** denotes significance on a 5% level or smaller. A bank’s bid rate refers to the 
spread between the average volume weighted bank specific bid rate and minimum bid rate. 
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